THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 5 JUN 71 PAGE

China Builds Nuclear Sub, Photos Hint

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

GROTON, Conn., June 4—U.S. aerial intelligence cameras recently have spotted what appears to be construction of Communist China's first nuclear-powered submarine.

Although the submarine is still in the early stages of construction, well-informed government officials say its hull is larger than any ever built in Chinese shipyards.

The configuration of the hull indicates to the experts that the submarine will have a nuclear power plant and that it probably will be an attack submarine rather than a missile-launching one.

Attack submarines could be used to knock out aircraft carriers, other surface vessels or enemy submarines.

The Chinese now have more than 40 attack submarines, but many of these are old Soviet-built models. All of them are diesel-powered. Nuclear power enables submarines to remain at sea for months without refueling.

While the Chinese submarine force is small and weak compared to the American and Soviet undersea armadas, it is the world's third largest.

See SUBMARINE, A7, Col. 4

SUBMARINE, From A1

In recent years, the Chinese have been building in their own yards a modernized version of the 1940-vintage R-Class medium-range submarine, which is also diesel-powered. Those submarines do not have the range to cruise very far from the Chinese mainland.

The Chinese also have a missile-firing submarine, a copy of the Soviet G-Class vessel. The Chinese built it in their shipyard at Dairen, Manchuria, in 1964 from parts left behind by the Soviets after they broke off their technical and military assistance to Communist China in the early 1960s.

The G-Class submarine carries only three short-range (380-mile) missiles. U.S. experts estimate that it would take the Chinese 8 to 10 years to develop and build a nuclear-powered submarine and missile-launching combination comparable to the U.S. Polaris.

Thus, while the Chinese submarine fleet is growing, it does not appear to pose any increased offensive threat to the U.S. mainland now.

A number of American China-watchers believe the recent trend in Chinese weaponry is toward short and medium-range arms for use against the Soviet Union, rather than long-range ones needed to hurt the United States.

Meanwhile, here at Groton, Conn., today the U.S. Navy launched its 100th nuclear-powered submarine, the USS Silversides. The USS Nautilus, the world's first nuclear-powered submarine, was launched 17 years ago from the same Groton shipyard of the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics.

The Silversides is the 59th attack submarine to join the U.S. fleet. The other 41 boats carry Polaris and Poseidon ballistic missiles.

While the U.S. Navy has stopped building missile-firing submarines, attack subs are still being produced at the rate of about five a year.

Navy Secretary John H. Chafee, speaking at the Silversides launching, said the Soviets turned out three times as many nuclear-powered submarines last year as the United States. The Soviets, however, are still building missile-firing vessels in an attempt to match the superior American fleet. About half of last year's Soviet submarine production was devoted to that type of ship.

As of now, the two superpowers both have about 92 nuclear-powered submarines of all kinds, but the Navy fears that the higher Soviet production rate will soon put the United States in second place.

Just before the $80 million Silversides slid down the ways, Chafee said, "It is one of the principal tragedies of our time that the resources of the nation must be poured into expensive, sophisticated and deadly weaponry which, if all goes well, will eventually be retired and replaced by other, more expensive weapons. But the facts of life for the United States of America are such that we have no acceptable alternative."

Intell Ltd. Gen.

THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 23 July 1971 PAGE 3

Professor Says His Plan May Free 2 Held in China

By Ronald Koven
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Nixon administration has under consideration a proposal to obtain the release of two of the four remaining U.S. prisoners on mainland China by conceding, in effect, that the pair was flying for the Central Intelligence Agency when they were shot down in late 1952, according to a top U.S. expert on Chinese law.

Prof. Jerome A. Cohen of the Harvard Law School said he had made the suggestion after discussing it with Chinese Communist diplomats in Ottawa last month and that the idea had received "working-level" endorsement inside the government.

Cohen said the Chinese did not indicate what their government would do if Washington were to drop its standing story that the two men strayed over China by mistake. But the diplomats told Cohen that his suggestion was worth considering.

Following Secretary of State William P. Rogers' orders not to discuss China policy now that President Nixon is in delicate negotiations about his projected visit to China, State Department officials refused to comment.

After testimony by Prof. Cohen before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman J. Fulbright (D-Ark.) wrote to Rogers expressing interest in the professor's suggestion.

The letter was dated July 6, three days before a secret visit to Peking by presidential adviser Henry Kissinger to set up Mr. Nixon's visit.

Any internal recommendation to alter the U.S. government's standard version of the 1952 overflight would presumably have come in the form of a recommendation to reply favorably upon Cohen's suggestion in an answer to Fulbright.

The two prisoners are John Thomas Downey and Richard Fecteau. Downey was sentenced to life imprisonment and Fecteau to 20 years in jail. Fecteau is due for release next year.

The two were shot down during the Korean War. The Chinese alleged that they were dropping supplies to U.S. agents in Manchuria.

Prof. Cohen and Downey were classmates at Yale University (class of 1951). Cohen has been active in an informal alumni write-to-your-congressman campaign to pressure the administration to obtain his release.

Cohen said in a telephone interview from his New England summer home that he has recently detected as subtle shift in the government's standard reply to such letters. He said that it has been shortened up and no longer involves "an absolute untruth" about the pair's mission and status, Cohen said.

The professor said he would not be surprised if Fecteau were to be released in the fall and if President Nixon subsequently brought Downey home with him on his plane from Peking.

Cohen said he has discussed the matter with State Department officials. He said that his last contact with Chinese diplomats in Ottawa was on June 26 and that it was only the most recent of three meetings he has had with them there.

The other two Americans known to be in Chinese prisons are two Air Force officers, Capt. Philip Smith and Lt. Robert J. Flynn. Just a year ago, the Chinese released a fifth man, the aged Bishop James E. Walsh. That release was seen primarily as a gesture to the Vatican, which had been making overtures to Peking.

THE WASHINGTON POST DATE PAGE 1

U.S. Cites Russian Buildup

A-Force Push 'Tremendous,' Laird Warns

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

WARRENTON, Va., Sept. 18 — Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird today delivered the Nixon administration's sharpest warning over the continued Soviet nuclear weapons buildup since May when the two superpowers announced they would try to control the arms race.

Laird said his report to Congress early next year on the new military budget will show that "there has been tremendous momentum in the last 10 months as far as the Soviet buildup is concerned."

"As each month goes by," he told a news conference, the estimates he made in March of the Russian land and sea-based missile buildup "if anything, have been too conservative. Statements that I was trying to scare people as Secretary of Defense" will be proved wrong.

Laird brought up the subject of the build-up. He said he was "still convinced that the American people do not want to be militarily inferior". And, he said, "the talk about budget-cutting will be something of the past as far as the Congress is concerned once they realize the significance of the tremendous momentum of the Soviet Union."

Though the defense chief provided no new details on Russian weapon development, informed government officials say U.S. satellites have spotted more than 50 ICBM silos being built in the Soviet Union.

Causing what is perhaps even more concern among Pentagon officials is what appears to be an accelerated construction pace for Soviet missile-firing submarines.

Defense officials say there are now about 25 of these subs operational or soon to be ready, and the Soviets will apparently draw abreast of the 41-submarine U.S. fleet—in numbers if not in quality—well before Laird's previous estimate of 1974.

Laird's stress on the Soviet buildup comes at a time when the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks at Helsinki are moving into a critical period if the goal of an agreement by the end of this year is to be met.

The Soviets already maintain a lead in the number of land-based ICBM's (1,054 for the U.S. and more than 1,500 for the USSR). And, while a number of strategists say that some imbalance in numbers will not tip the power scale, even those officials within the administration pushing hardest for an arms pact say that the President and Congress would face a political problem in approving any agreement which allowed the Soviets to compond their lead even more with missile-firing submarines.

The Soviets apparently are pressing to get as much weaponry as possible underway before any limitations are negotiated. Laird's remarks appeared to be part of U.S. efforts to slow them down.

Laird met with newsmen at a conference center here where defense and military officials have been gathering annually for the past three years to review Pentagon problems and policies.

Though the emphasis was on the Soviets, Laird and Adm. Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also got hourly reports on the tense situation in the Middle East arising out of the downing of an Israeli transport yesterday inside Israeli-occupied Sinai. No U.S. forces have been put on alert, however.

In other areas, Laird said:

While a number of lawmakers have been pressing for troop cuts in Europe, over the past year the U.S. has been beefing up the garrison in Europe to replace men moved to Indochina. Laird said removal of "the Vietnam straight jacket" allowed the U.S. to fill about 16,000 billets previously empty and rebuild troop strengths to about 97 per cent of the 300,000 men authorized.

Laird said discussions "will be going forward" on mutual East-West troop cuts in Europe, and that the U.S. should not make unilateral reductions at this time. Some administration officials believe the talks will start early in 1972.

Laird would not comment on the upcoming Cannikin underground nuclear test, which has raised considerable controversy. He was asked whether he had any indication that the five-megaton blast of an ABM warhead would be canceled or postponed. On previous occasions, Laird has stressed the military importance of that test.

Some military officials hinted yesterday that the tests may be postponed but not canceled, though the final decision is up to the President.

Laird cautioned against speculation concerning the pace of U.S. withdrawls from Vietnam. Adm. Moorer pointed out that this was the first year in which Vietnam was not on the agenda of the three-day conference, but both men warned against reading anything into this.

Last June, it was reported that pressure was building to increase the withdrawal rate to about 20,000 per month after the next presidential announcement, due Nov. 15. Officials estimate privately that this will bring the U.S. down to about 40,000 men left in Vietnam by next spring or summer.

Asked if the new draft extension bill would be the last one, Laird said hopes for ending the draft by mid-1973 rested primarily on the willingness of Americans, particularly young people, to recognize the need for a military service and to respect it. Adm. Moorer added that the country could not take its national security for granted as it has and then "degrade and demean" the men who choose a military career.

On the budget, Laird said "I can assure you that we are not going to be able to decrease military spending" at this time.

Despite the nation's economic problems, Laird was optimistic that the U.S. woild remain the world's number one economic power. "But I wish I could say the same thing about the number one position of the United States militarily as we look to 1973, 74, and 75."

Referring to his previous estimate of an $80 billion defense budget next year "give or take 2-3 per cent," Laird said that if the 2-3 per cent is taken away from $80 billion, "I cannot give you the assurance . . . that the U.S. will not slip into the position of a second-rate military power."

NEW YORK TIMES DATE 1974 PAGE 1

F.B.I. Is Said to Have Cut Direct Liaison With C.I.A.

Hoover Move in Quarrel 1½ Years Ago Causes Concern Among Intelligence Officials About Coping With Spies

By ROBERT M. SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 9—The Federal Bureau of Investigation broke off direct liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency a year and a half ago because the C.I.A. would not tell J. Edgar Hoover who had leaked information from his organization, according to authoritative sources.

As a result, high officials of the intelligence community are concerned about the Government's ability to control foreign espionage in this country. Their apprehension has been increased by the recent British discovery of extensive Soviet operations.

To offset some of the danger, officials of the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. have held private meetings, unknown to Mr. Hoover, at which they exchanged information. Authorized communication is limited to mail, telephone and infrequent special meetings.

F. B. I. Spokesman's Statement

Asked if it was true that the bureau broke direct liaison with the C.I.A. more than a year ago, an F.B.I. spokesman said today. "It is not true." He added, "The F.B.I. has always maintained liaison with the C.I.A., and it is very close and effective liaison." Spokesmen for the C.I.A. could not be reached today.

The suspension of direct contact is one of the factors prompting leading members of the intelligence community to feel that Mr. Hoover must be deposed as Director of the F.B.I. The feelings of these officials run so high that some of them have dropped their customary secrecy to make their views known. Others remain silent because they fear public criticism might boomerang, reinforcing Mr. Hoover's desire to continue in his post and evoking public support for him.

Reputation a Factor

Adding to the anxiety and anger of members of the intelligence community is Mr. Hoover's reputation. In their view, his personality is a compound of insecurity and authoritarianism. They fear the 76-year-old Director will do nothing to repair the breakdown in liaison between the two agencies and will try to remain as long as he can at the post he has held for 46 years.

Mr. Hoover's retirement has been periodically predicted and

Continued on Page 62, Column 1

Continued From Page 1 , Col. 4

is said to be favored, for a variety of reasons, by several prominent members of the Administration. But so far there is no sign that he has lost the backing of the one person who counts—President Nixon.

Only four cases involving the exposure of foreign espionage agents in the United States have come to public attention in the last three years. Two of the cases involved the expulsion of Soviet agents; another involved two Cuban diplomats at the United Nations and a South African girl, and the fourth dealt with a Swiss Government official.

The story of the severance of F.B.I.-C.I.A. liaison begins with the disappearance of Prof. Thomas Riha in March, 1969. Mr. Riha was a Czech-born associate professor of modern Russian history at the University of Colorado.

The 40-year-old professor left the university abruptly, apparently took nothing with him and left a mysterious trail. He disappeared from the campus so suddenly that, though normally a neat and precise man, he left papers scattered on his university desk where he had been preparing his income tax return.

Friends and fellow faculty members said they feared that Professor Riha might be dead, but police officials in Boulder and Denver and the former president of the university, Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, insisted that he was alive.

Dr. Smiley told the press enigmatically at the time that he had been assured of the professor's safety "by what I consider reliable sources" in Washington.

"I repeat my real regret that I can't go beyond what I have said," he told The New York Times in a telephone interview in January, 1970. "A confidence is a confidence."

Confidential Information

What Dr. Smiley, by then president of the University of Texas at El Paso, could not say was that he had been given the information concerning Professor Riha in confidence by an employe of the C.I.A.

The agency was interested in the Riha case because of the professor's Czech origin. It wanted to know if there had been foreign interference. The F.B.I. learned that there had been no foul play, that the professor had chosen to leave for personal reasons.

According to well informed sources, an individual agent in the F.B.I.'s large Denver office, acting on his own, told a C.I.A. employe in Denver. (The C.I.A. is restricted by law from operating as an intelligence agency within this country. The employe in Denver was involved in recruiting.)

The agency then suggested that the F.B.I. tell Dr. Smiley, who was very concerned about Mr. Riha's disappearance, what had happened on a confidential basis to quiet his and the community's fears. The bureau refused.

After the refusal, the C.I.A. went ahead and told Dr. Smiley, pledging him to secrecy. According to reliable sources, Dr. Smiley later inadvertently let it get out that there had been no foul play. The question arose at F.B.I. headquarters in Washington: How had the president of the university obtained this information?

The bureau office in Denver told headquarters that it had not given the information to anyone. It eventually was learned here, however, that an individual F.B.I. man had told the story to a C.I.A. man. For Mr. Hoover, the question then became: Which of my men gave out this information? He asked the C.I.A.

The C.I.A. man in Denver was inflexible. He told his superiors that the information had been given him in confidence and it was a matter of conscience. According to sources, he well knew what would happen to any F.B.I. man he named—at the least, exile to Montana; at the most, dismissal.

The C.I.A. man held his ground under pressure from the bureau, saying any disclosure would be a breach of faith. The Director of the C.I.A., Richard Helms, accepted his man's position and refused to force him to divulge the F.B.I. man's identity.

Irritated, Mr. Hoover broke off all direct liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Until February of last year, the F.B.I. man who provided the personal link with the C.I.A. was Sam Papich. Mr. Papich grew up in Montana and worked in mines there before he attended Northwestern University. He played professional football, then went to work for the F.B.I.

Mr. Papich worked in Latin America for a while for the bureau and handled several special assignments. He later became the liaison officer between the bureau and the C.I.A. His reputation was that of an

honest and single-minded with high professional competence and an insatiable appetite for work. Most importantly, in an area potentially fraught with jealousy, intrigue and deceit, he had the trust of the C.I.A. and the respect of the F.B.I.

When Mr. Hoover took his action severing liaison, Mr. Papich was despondent. He is known to have beseeched the Director in the strongest language to reconsider, pleading that a close relationship between the two agencies was vital to controlling Communist-bloc intelligence operatives.

He is known to have told Mr. Hoover that the United States had never faced the kind of sophisticated and dangerous Soviet-bloc espionage that it did then, in 1970. He also argued that the complexity of intelligence cases, coupled with the swiftness of travel and communication, had made direct links necessary between the bureau and more than a dozen C.I.A. officials every day.

Mr. Papich said that communicating with the C.I.A. by mail would be an impossible arrangement and warned Mr. Hoover that a continuation of the rupture might leave a dangerous gap, which enemy agents would very likely try to exploit.

Urging a reconciliation, Mr. Papich retired from the bureau in March, 1970, expressing the hope that Mr. Hoover would appoint a new liaison officer who might more easily smooth over the difficulties between the two agencies. According to reliable sources, Mr. Hoover never responded to his pleas.

Only Limited Contact

Since the Denver incident, therefore, the bulk of the communication and coordination between the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. has been by telephone and correspondence, with very limited contact approved by Mr. Hoover on an ad hoc basis. Both agencies remain members of the United States Intelligence Board, and there is presumably also some interchange through the board.

But men in both the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. have found telephoning and mailing letters back and forth so grossly inadequate that they are known to meet with one another privately, without Mr. Hoover's knowledge.

One member of the intelligence community explained that personal contact is necessary for a variety of reasons: The cases are sometimes complex and sometimes split between the two agencies, speed is often essential to successful action, conferences involving several people are sometimes necessary, written material is occasionally involved and there are not enough secure telephone lines for the volume of work.

Information generally exchanged between the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. might concern such subjects as officers of the Black Panther party traveling overseas, Soviet diplomats en route to this country, the activities

J. Edgar Hoover

of an international arms dealer and American youngsters cutting sugar cane in Cuba.

In July of last year—four months after he had severed direct liaison with the C.I.A.—Mr. Hoover abolished the seven-man section that maintained contact with the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the National Security Agency, the State Department, the Post Office, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the United States Information Agency, the Bureau of Customs and the Immigration Service. These agencies were disappointed and distressed at the new arrangement.

Mr. Hoover is reported to have said the work of the section could be properly handled by telephone and correspondence.

The speculation within the F.B.I., however, was that Mr. Hoover had taken the action because of criticism he was getting about the rupture with the C.I.A. According to the speculation, he wanted to show that he was not discriminating against the C.I.A. and that all relations could be handled by phone and mail. The various agencies are still hoping that direct liaison will be re-established.

Members of the intelligence community here also pronounced themselves unhappy last week with the retirement from the F.B.I. of William C. Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan spent 30 years in the bureau, became an expert on domestic intelligence and rose to the position of assistant to the Director before Mr. Hoover reportedly became so unhappy with him that he changed the lock on Mr. Sullivan's door to force him out of the agency.

Mr. Sullivan, who has a reputation as a scholarly researcher on Communist philosophy and tactics and was known as a moderating force in the F.B.I., apparently had several disputes with Mr. Hoover. What triggered his forced retirement is not known. Members of the intelligence community report, however, that one of the arguments in which he was involved concerned surveillance of foreign agents in this country.

According to the intelligence officials, Mr. Sullivan asked some time ago for more men and money to counter Soviet-bloc espionage and was turned down by Mr. Hoover. For nine years Mr. Sullivan headed the F.B.I.'s Domestic Intelligence Division and was concerned about the bureau's ability to neutralize foreign spies.

Intelligence officials here say they now believe the F.B.I. is doing such a poor job in that area that the threat from foreign agents is substantial. They argue that Mr. Hoover is so intent on preventing any embarrassment to the F.B.I. or any sullying of his reputation that he avoids the risks of counter-espionage work.

As an example of such risks, the officials point out that an F.B.I. man might find himself apprehended by the police when he does a "bag job"—a surreptitious piece of counterespionage sometimes involving illegal activity. Or, they say, if an F.B.I. man approaches a foreign diplomat and asks him to defect or spy, the bureau runs the risk of a refusal and possibly a diplomatic uproar.

Other sources in Government agree that the F.B.I.'s successes in the spy field do seem to be limited and to consist in large measure of defectors who appear at some F.B.I. office. But they argue that the main problem is the F.B.I.'s orientation as a criminal investigative agency.

"The agents are basically trained in criminal procedures and techniques and think in criminal terms," explained one official in the Justice Department. "The subtleties of intelligence work seem to elude them."

The Case of Abel

The classic example, the official said, was the famous case involving Col. Rudolf I. Abel, the Russian master spy who operated in the United States from 1948 until 1957. The case was really cracked not by the F.B.I., he said, but by the C.I.A.

The official explained that Reino Hayhanen, the Soviet defector who was the key to the case, walked into the F.B.I. liaison office in Paris in June, 1957, and began to tell his story but was cut short by the F.B.I. agent. The agent reportedly told him that what he had to say was interesting but was more in the C.I.A.'s area.

When Hayhanen went round to the C.I.A. office in Paris, the agents became excited, rang up the F.B.I. man, told him to listen to Hayhanen and sent him back.

The official—who said that the F.B.I. is still not doing well in counterespionage—identified one problem as lack of expertise. "In Washington," he said, "there are some F.B.I. men who specialize in security, but in most other places a man can be working on both criminal and security cases on the same day. They don't have enough specialists."

THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 1 NOV 71 PAGE 5

Mother of Prisoner Begins Visit to China

Reuter

HONG KONG, Oct. 31—Mary Downey crossed into China today to visit her son John, 41, a former U.S. Army employee, who is serving a life sentence in a Chinese prison on espionage charges. John T. Downey, a Department of the Army civilian employee, was a passenger aboard an aircraft which disappeared on a scheduled flight from South Korea to Japan on Nov. 29, 1952.

NEW YORK TIMES DATE 16 NOV 71 PAGE 6

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, Nov. 15 — The mother of an American held captive in China for 19 years said today he believes chances are good that he will be released and not have to serve out his life sentence.

Mrs. Mary V. Downey, of New Britain, Conn., who is 70 years old, reported this after a two-week visit to China. During her stay Mrs. Downey met eight times with her son, John Thomas Downey, who is imprisoned in Peking.

Mr. Downey, a civilian employe of the United States Army, was aboard a plane that took off from South Korea in 1952, during the Korean war, and disappeared.

The Defense Department said the plane had been on a flight to Japan but Peking accused Mr. Downey of espionage and having been connected to a spy network in China, and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

Diplomatic sources said that on the basis of Mrs. Downey's report it now seemed likely that Mr. Downey, 41, and Richard G. Fecteau, 44, who had been on the plane with Mr. Downey, would soon be released. Mr. Fecteau, who is from Lynn, Mass. and was also a civilian employe of the Army, was given a 20-year sentence and would be due for release next year.

The sources said that release of the Americans was the type of goodwill gesture that might be expected from China to set the stage for the President Nixon's planned visit to China after the first of the year.

The sources said they hoped that China might also release two other imprisoned American Air Force pilots, Capt. Philip E. Smith, 37, and Lieut. Robert J. Flynn, 33, forced down after having strayed over China during missions in North Vietnam.

Mrs. Downey, accompanied to China by a son, William Downey, a New York lawyer, and his wife, said they had been permitted to visit once with Mr. Fecteau and that they had found him "in excellent health and fine spirits." She said she had also found Mr. Downey in that condition.

Mrs. Downey stated, "At the end of our visit, Jack told us that he had been informed by the prison authorities that his case was being reviewed to determine whether, under their policy of leniency, he might be released rather than serve out his life sentence."

She continued: "The prison officials told Jack that an important factor in deciding whether to apply leniency was the prisoner's behavior while in prison, and that they considered that his behavior had been good.

"We have no assurance that Jack will be released, nor, if so, when. But Jack said that he did not think that the prison officials would tell him about this possibility, and have him in turn tell it to us, unless the chances were good."

Despite Its Being in the Telephone Book

CIA Is an Unlisted Number When Congress Dials

By Flora Lewis

SO FAR as I've found in a lot of traveling, the United States is the only country in the world which lists its central intelligence agency in the telephone book, and enables anyone to call up and speak to the director's office.

But an extraordinary exchange on the floor of the Senate recently made clear how little else the people who put up the money for intelligence know about how it's spent. The debate took place on the day the military appropriations bill was finally passed so it attracted little attention, but it was revealing.

It was provoked by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) who offered an amendment providing that not more than $4 billion in the defense budget could go for the intelligence services, including the CIA, the National Security Agency and the intelligence branches of the various armed services. Symington's point was not only to set a limit, but to set a precedent.

CONGRESS does appropriate all the money that goes to intelligence, but it doesn't know how much, or even when and how. That's because it is hidden in the defense budget, with the result that Congress doesn't really know just what it is appropriating *any* military money for because it never knows which items have been selected for padding to hide extra funds for intelligence.

Evidently, Symington believes that the actual amount spent is a little over $4 billion, intsead of the $6 billion reported in the press, because he wasn't trying to cut intelligence funds except for CIA payments to Thai soldiers in Laos. He is one of the nine senators entitled to go to meetings of the Appropriations Subcommittee on the CIA, supposedly the confidential watchdog over the agency. As he pointed out though, there hasn't been a full meeting all this year.

What he wanted to do was to establish that Congress does have some rights to monitor the intelligence empire which it created by law, and he was driven to the attempt because of exasperation at President Nixon's recent intelligence reorganization. It was announced to the public as an upgrading of CIA Director Richard Helms and a better method to avoid waste and establish political control.

Senator Symington and many other well-informed CIA watchers in Washington, are convinced that Helms has been kicked upstairs. The result, they believe, will be an increase in military influence over intelligence—which has been recognized as a danger throughout the history of intelligence because it tends to become self-serving, the doctor diagnosing himself according to the therapy he likes.

There is also a concern that the reorganization, which makes the President's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger top dog over intelligence, will centralize the system so much that it will become a tool for White House aims, not an outside source of technical expertise.

Responsible political control over the intelligence community's actions, as distinct from its factual and analytical reports, is necessary and desirable. But despite the public impression, in the last few years the CIA has been the most honest source of information for Congress on sensitive issues such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, while the Pentagon, State and White House have dealt in obfuscations. Whatever his Department of Dirty Tricks might be doing, Helms has been more straightforward with his secret session testimony on what is really happening in these unhappy places than the people who do have to explain and justify their funding to Congress.

BUT, as the Senate debate showed, that isn't saying very much. Sen. Allen Ellender (D-La.), who heads the CIA subcommittee, pointed out that 20 years ago only two senators and two congressmen were allowed to know what the CIA was spending, and now there are five on each side of the Capitol.

He implied that they also knew what the CIA was spending its money for. Sen. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), had the wit to ask if that mean Ellender knew, before the CIA set up its secret army in Laos, that this was the purpose of the appropriation. Ellender said, "It was not, I did not know anything about it . . . it never dawned on me to ask about it."

Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), had the humor to point out that there has been a lot in the press about the CIA Laotian army in the past couple of years, and asked whether Ellender has now inquired about it. Ellender said, "I have not inquired." Cranston pointed out that since nobody else in Congress has Ellender's right to check the CIA, that meant nobody in Congress knows. Ellender replied, "Probably not."

Symington's amendment was defeated. But at least the record is now clear. A recent Newsweek article quoted a former CIA official as saying, "There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive closer scrutiny and 'control' than the CIA."

"The reverse of that statement is true," said Symington, "and it is shameful for the American people to be misled." The record proves him right.

Until ad Gen

11 MAY 1971

Nixon Reported Weighing Revamping of Intelligence Services

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 10 — President Nixon is said to be considering a major reorganization of the nation's foreign intelligence activities to improve output and cut costs.

Those familiar with the plan say that the options range from creating a new Cabinet-level department of intelligence to merely strengthening the now-imprecise authority of Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, over the global intelligence operations of the Pentagon and other federal agencies.

The reorganization plan has recently been presented to President Nixon. It covers 30 to 40 typewritten pages and was prepared primarily by James R. Schlesinger, assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, and K. Wayne Smith, a former Pentagon systems analyst now on the National Security Council staff.

The informants say the plan grew from instructions Mr. Nixon gave his staff last autumn, to draft various reorganizational and cost-cutting studies.

Complaints Voiced

Both the President and Henry A. Kissinger, his assistant for national security affairs, have frequently expressed dissatisfaction over the erratic quality of the foreign intelligence provided them. Some White House officials estimate that at least $500-million could be cut from the $5-billion spent annually on national intelligence.

Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have said that while occasionally intelligence of extreme usefulness — such as the incredibly detailed information on Soviet and Chinese Communist missile development obtained from spy satellites — has been produced, the service has frequently failed to forecast such sudden developments as the riots that forced a political reshuffle in Poland last December.

Mr. Nixon is particularly dissatisfied, his associates say, by the cost and size of the Government's global intelligence operations when compared with their results. In addition to the Central Intelligence Agency, five federal agencies are involved in intelligence overseas. At least 200,000 people are involved, 150,000 of these uniformed personnel in the Defense Department.

The President was seriously irritated, aides say, by two recent failures of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, which numbers 3,000 and spends an estimated $500-million yearly. One was faulty intelligence prior to the abortive prison-camp raid at Sontay, in North Vietnam, last November. The other was failure to forecast North Vietnamese resistance to the South Vietnamese Army's incursion into Laos Feb. 5 to March 25.

'Their Estimates Were Better'

"Hanoi threw 35,000 men or four divisions against the 17,000 in ARVN," said one qualifed source. "They stripped North Vietnam of troops, gambling that the United States wouldn't invade the North — and they were right. Their estimates were better than ours."

The most drastic option open to Mr. Nixon would be the creation of a new department of intelligence to be headed by an official of Cabinet rank. It would combine the Central Intelligence Agency with 15,000 civilian employes; the Defense Department's code-cracking National Security Agency with 100,000 uniformed personnel and tis Defense Intelligence Agency with 3,000. The C.I.A. spends about $500-million yearly; the National Security Agency $1-billion and the Defense Intelligence Agency $500-million.

The merit, some experts say, would be to concentrate in one department the collection of foreign intelligence now performed not only by the C.I.A. but also by the Army, Navy, and Air Force separately around the world. However, opposition would be forthcoming from vested interests in the armed services and in Congress. They say, therefore, that Mr. Nixon is unlikely to adopt it.

At the other end of the scale, informants report, Mr. Nixon could merely issue an executive order defining — thus strengthening — the authority of Mr. Helms over the intelligence operations of such powerful federal agencies as the Pentagon, the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Officers Meet Weekly

Their principal intelligence officers meet weekly as members of the United States Intelligence Board. Mr. Helms, as the President's chief intelligence adviser and head of the C.I.A., presides, but his authority is unclear. It derives from a letter written by President Kennedy in 1963 to John A. McCone, one of Mr. Helms,s predecessors, and has never been updated.

While Mr. Helms has full control over the C.I.A., the Pentagon's worldwide intelligence gathering activities, which Robert F. Froehlke, an Assistant Secretary of Defense has estimated costs $2.9-billion yearly.

"When you have the authority but don't control the resources," a Defense Department official observed, "you tend to walk very softly."

The President is said to regard Mr. Helms as the nation's most competent professional intelligence officer. Last month, informants disclose, Mr. Nixon wrote Mr. Helms congratulating the C.I.A. on its recent annual estimate of Soviet defense capabilities.

To provide control over the huge intelligence system and make it responsive to his needs, Mr. Nixon is likely, his staff associates say, to choose one — or a combination of — the middle options before him that do not require Congressional approval.

Closer Ties Possible

It is likely, oficials say, that Mr. Nixon will eventually bring Mr. Helms and a top-level staff of evaluators from C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., closer to the White House, possibly into the National Security Council staff.

Officials concede that under a reorganization Mr. Helms might relinquish to his deputy, Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, of the Marine Corps, some of his responsibility for the C.I.A.'s day-to-day collection operations and concentrate, instead, on intelligence evaluation for the President. One possibility envisaged under the reorganization would be the creation by Mr. Helms of an evaluation staff in the White House drawn from the C.I.A.'s Office of Current Intelligence and its Office of National Estimates. The latter prepares long - range studies in depth of potential trouble spots.

Another would be the creation by Mr. Nixon of a White House intelligence evaluations staff made up of Mr. Helms, General Cushman, Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Ray S. Cline, director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.